History
The charter granted by the state of Connecticut to the New London, Willimantic & Springfield authorized the incorporators to build from New London, north along the west bank of the Thames River to Norwich and from there through the Yantic, Shetucket, and Willimantic Rivers to the Massachusetts state line where they were to connect with the New London, Willimantic & Palmer, a Massachusetts corporation.
James Palmer, an engineer contracted to survey the route, delivered a promising, some would say overly optimistic, report of the potential profit of the proposed route. Charles Fisher, an early Connecticut railroad historian, summed up the situation: “There is no question but that the incorporators were captivated by the charm and persuasion of James Palmer, Engineer. His report, based on the experiences of the Norwich & Worcester, Housatonic, and Hartford & New Haven companies was convincing and his estimates of earnings and costs of operation did not seem too optimistic.”1
In fairness to Palmer, he based his estimates on the railroad reaching not only a connection with the Western Railroad (at a point now known as the town of Palmer, Mass.), he also anticipated the railroad would extend westward to the large mill town of Springfield. Access to the traffic from Springfield would certainly have benefited the railroad’s profitability. Adding to the road’s financial straits was the tendency of people along the route to subscribe to the stock issues, but fail to actually meet the payments for their shares when due.
In his assessment of the Report of 1847, Charles Fisher found Palmer, and railroad president Thomas Williams, “contained much detail and many observations that support faith in the enterprise but they lacked vital statistics of operation with which modern reports are replete.2 The numbers told a vastly different story. Palmer estimated gross earnings of $159,319.00 – considerably more than the $66,460.00 the railroad actually generated.
There were some years the NLW&P, as the entire system was now called showed a modest profit from operation. In 1855 the line generated $30,771.693 {Third Annual report} and that had increased slightly to $38,262.07 in 1858 4{Fifth Annual Report . .. }. But the company was far from solvent since when short- and long-term debt and capital costs are factored in the railroad was consistently $1.5 million in the red through these years.
While Thomas Williams was a skilled businessman – it was he who had been credited with reviving New London’s flagging whaling industry in the years after the War of 1812 – drawing a profit out of his railroad proved an insurmountable summit for him. In 1852 he resigned as President and left for Europe. His replacement, Gordon Lester Ford had some initial success – completing a connection with the Norwich & Worcester in Norwich, discussed in one form or another since 1847, as well as acquiring the small Amherst, Belchertown & Palmer Railroad.
But none could deny the railroad was in dire financial straits. The 1855-56 Third Annual Report of the General Railroad Commissioners of the State of Connecticut summarized the condition of the line at the end of 1856. “Since our last report, the Company have erected a commodious depot at Norwich, and made various other repairs upon their buildings. The cars and engines are in order for service, and sufficient for the business of the road.”5 At the time, the NLW&P locomotives were getting older, with the cost of maintenance increasing. Likewise, newer locomotives were capable of maintaining speeds greater than the 12 mile-per-hour average for freight trains and 22 mph average for passenger trains.6
The Commissioners continue their summary by stating the “Company expresses the belief that it has passed through its severest financial trials, and confidently hope for a better business.”7
Ford proved to be a capable, if not overly imaginative manager. By carefully managing operating costs he was even able to show a small net profit after interest for 1854 and 1855. In 1856, one of the directors, Edward Crane, proposed the Board petition the General Assembly of Connecticut for permission to lease or sell “any portion of the road to any connecting road or o any road within the state.” {Fisher p 68} According to Fisher, it was “Mr. Crane’s hope to use the mileage between Norwich and New London as an integral part of a through line between Boston and New York.” 8 Although this was an entirely logical proposal, it is somewhat doubtful it could have made the road profitable. In any event, the bondholders would not permit it. By 1856, the NLW&P sought to defer interest payments on bonds. The perpetually cash short NLW&P suffered severe financial downturns, not only from a downturn in business in 1857 but also the financial panics of 1857 and 1859. On January 5, 1859, the Board authorized the President to put the railroad into receivership.
The NLW&P emerged from reorganization as the New London Northern Railroad. The NLN found itself with a half dozen antiquated locomotives. New engines and cars were ordered. On February 8, 1864, the NLN acquired control of the Amherst, Belchertown & Palmer and by 1867 it had been extended to Grout’s Corners (modern day Millers Falls), connecting the NLN to Vermont & Massachusetts, which itself connected up the Connecticut River valley with the Vermont Central Railroad’s line to Canada. The NLN quickly became more important than Palmer or Thompson ever realized. In the years before completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway, the would offer Canada access to a year-round port.
In 1871 J. Gregory and Washington C. Smith of St. Albans, Vermont, who controlled the Central Vermont Railroad, had leased the New London Northern, with the understanding that control of the railroad might be transferred to other Vermont Central trustees or directors, but no other party. Starting in 1871, the New London Northern operated as part of the Vermont Central (later Central Vermont) Railway, providing a key link to the CV’s steamship connection between New London and New York. Today, the New England Central, which replaced the CV in 1995, still runs trains along the western bank of the Thames River, following the same route surveyed by James Palmer in 1847.